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Can’t Live With ‘Em Can’t Live Without ‘Em: An
Analysis of the Trial Court’s Authority to Hear
and Decide Child-Related Claims in North
Carolina Post-Baumann
AMY L. BRITT* AND ALICIA JURNEY WHITLOCK**
In Baumann-Chacon v. Baumann, decided in May 2011, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals held for the first time that trial courts have
the authority to enter orders related to child custody and child support
before a husband and wife have separated.1 The Baumann court carefully
distinguished its decision from the holding in Harper v. Harper, a 1981
case in which the court held that the wife’s pre-separation custody and
child support claims should have been dismissed.2 The Baumann decision raises some interesting questions about the limits of the trial court’s
ability to enter orders protecting the interests of children when those interests conflict with the rights of parents.
Part I of this Article discusses the historical background of the role
of fault in divorce and other domestic claims in the United States and
North Carolina. Part II analyzes the Court of Appeals’ decision in Harper and the state of the law following the Harper ruling. Part III analyzes
the Court of Appeals’ decision in Baumann. Part IV considers how North
Carolina’s approach to pre-separation child custody and support claims
compares to the law in other states. Finally, Part V discusses the implications and application of Baumann for North Carolina practitioners.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In order to understand the significance of Baumann, it is important
to consider the role of fault in domestic claims in a historical context.

* Amy L. Britt is an associate and a Board Certified Specialist in Family Law practicing at
Cheshire Parker Schneider & Bryan, PLLC in Raleigh, North Carolina.
** Alicia Jurney Whitlock is an associate in the litigation practice group of Smith Debnam Narron Drake Saintsing & Myers, LLP in Raleigh, North Carolina.
1. Baumann-Chacon v. Baumann, 710 S.E.2d 431 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
2. Harper v. Harper, 273 S.E.2d 731 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
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A. Historical Background of No-Fault Divorce in the United States
In the second half of the nineteenth century, most states’ divorce
laws included more expansive fault grounds for divorce and, therefore,
were more permissive than they were in the early nineteenth century.3
In the last quarter of the century, many blamed the expanded fault bases
for the rising number of divorces and, “[i]n response, a number of states
restricted [their] fault grounds.”4 Divorce laws in the United States varied extensively by the middle of the twentieth century, with some states
reflecting fewer and more conservative fault grounds, and others maintaining their expanded fault grounds.5 Notwithstanding discrepancies
among the states, all of these laws reflected the same basic premise: “that
divorce was an adversary proceeding in which an innocent spouse ‘won’
a divorce from a guilty spouse.”6
The practical result of these fault-based divorce laws was a disparity
between the statutory law and the law in action. For example, until
1967, New York recognized only adultery as grounds for divorce and,
rather than having the intended effect of discouraging divorce, the practical effect was frequently collusion, perjury, and fabricated grounds for
divorce.7 This disparity illustrated American society’s rejection of the
severe limitations imposed by some states on the right to divorce.8
By the mid-1960s, reform was underway.9 California led the way
and proposed legislation that would allow a divorce upon a showing of
“irreconcilable differences causing the irremediable breakdown of the
marriage.”10 The enacted legislation eliminated the fault-based scheme
in California and “the need for either party to establish [the] ‘guilt’ of the
other . . . to end in law a marriage that one or both of the parties believed had ended in fact.”11
In many ways, the California statute became the model of divorce
reform in the 1970s. Like California, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act of 1973 (UMDA) “relied on [the] irretrievable breakdown [of the
3. 2 SUZANNE REYNOLDS, LEE’S NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 7.2 (5th ed. 1999).
4. Id. (citing N.M. BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED
STATES 84 (1962)).
5. Id. (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 503 (2d ed.
1985)).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. (citing 1969 Cal. Stat. 3324).
11. Id.
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marriage] for the basis of the decree of dissolution.”12 Although few
states have adopted the UMDA in its entirety,13 divorce laws of most
states reflect the concept of marriage breakdown as the most important
inquiry in the granting of a divorce decree.14 “Today the statutes of all
states recognize at least one no-fault basis for divorce . . . .”15
B. Historical Background of Fault Bases in North Carolina
Prior to 1977, wrongful conduct barred a divorce based on separation in North Carolina. The doctrine of recrimination denied a divorce
to a petitioning spouse guilty of misconduct that would entitle the other
spouse to a divorce.16 In Byers II, a 1943 decision, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals stated in dicta:
The law generally forbids redress to one for an injury done him by
another, if he himself first be in the wrong about the same matters whereof he complains. . . . No one is permitted to profit by his own fraud, or
to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found a claim on his own iniquity, or to acquire rights by his own crime. . . .
. . . Nor is it to be ascribed as the legislative intent that one spouse may
drive the other from their home for [the statutory period of separation],
without any cause or excuse, and then obtain a divorce solely upon the
ground of such separation created by the complainant’s own dereliction. Out
of unilateral wrongs arise rights in favor of the wronged, but not in favor of
the wrongdoer. One who plants a domestic thornbush or thistle need not expect to gather grapes or figs from it.17

In 1977 and 1979, the General Assembly enacted amendments,
which effectively eliminated the role of fault in divorce based on separa-

12. Id.
13. Id. § 7.2 & n.50 (5th ed. Supp. 2011) (citing 9A U.L.A. 10 (Supp. 1998)) (“As of
[the publication of this article], only Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana and Washington had adopted the UDMA or major parts of it.”).
14. Id.
15. Id. § 7.3. Until August 2010, New York still lacked a unilateral “no-fault” divorce
statute. Under New York divorce law only if both parties notarized a separation agreement and lived separately for one year, could a judge convert it into a divorce. New York
governor David Paterson signed a no-fault divorce bill on August 13, 2010, which went
into effect on October 12, 2010 making New York the last state in the United States to
adopt no-fault divorce. See Act of Aug. 13, 2010, ch. 384, 2010 N.Y. Sess. Laws (McKinney) (codified as amended at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170.7 (McKinney 2010)).
16. See Hyder v. Hyder, 1 S.E.2d 540 (N.C. 1939); Brown v. Brown, 196 S.E. 333
(N.C. 1938); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 181 S.E. 338 (N.C. 1935).
17. Byers v. Byers, 25 S.E.2d 466, 469–470 (N.C. 1943) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
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tion. In the first 1977 amendment, all defenses based upon misconduct
as established in section 50-5 of the North Carolina General Statutes
were abolished.18 “The second 1977 amendment abolished all defenses
based on misconduct as established in [s]ection 50-7.”19 Finally, the
1979 “amendment abolished the defenses of res judicata and recrimination without regard to any statutory reference to . . . misconduct.”20
Despite the 1977 and 1979 amendments to the divorce statutes,
fault bases survived in a support context until 1995. Prior to 1995,
The entitlement provision for alimony, which the law applied also to
alimony pendente lite, gave marital misconduct a central role: alimony
pendente lite was not available unless it appeared to the court that the
dependent spouse could prove that the supporting spouse had committed an act of marital misconduct enumerated in the statute.21

The 1995 statutory amendments increased attention to needs, reimbursement and rehabilitation, and “eliminated the role of marital misconduct as a prerequisite to entitlement.”22 In its 1995 revisions, the
General Assembly made need the only requirement for an award of alimony.23 According to Professor Suzanne Reynolds, with the 1995
amendments, “[n]eed is the central inquiry in the alimony determination, with fault relegated to ‘factor’ status. . . . Although the list starts
with marital misconduct, all of the other fifteen factors focus on the economic circumstances of the parties.”24 The current statute downgrades
“fault to a secondary position, only one of many, often more significant,
factors.”25 An award of post-separation support, like an award of alimony, is based on economic factors, and the court may appropriately award
spousal support if neither spouse offers evidence of misconduct.26 As
between post-separation and alimony, fault is even less significant for
post-separation support.27

18. REYNOLDS, supra note 3, § 7.4 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-5(1)–(5) (Repl. Vol.
1976)).
19. Id.
20. Id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (2011); 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 775, 775–76.
21. REYNOLDS, supra note 3, § 8.2; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-16.2–.3 (1994),
repealed by 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 641.
22. REYNOLDS, supra note 3, § 8.2.
23. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A (2011); 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 641, 643–45.
24. REYNOLDS, supra note 3, § 9.3.
25. Id.
26. Id. § 8.2.
27. See id.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss2/5

4

WHITLOCK FINAL

4/12/2012 9:09 AM

Britt and Whitlock: Can't Live With 'Em Can't Live Without 'Em: An Analysis of the Tr

2012]

CHILD-RELATED CLAIMS POST-BAUMANN

453

II. THE HARPER DECISION
At the time of the Harper decision in 1981, fault was still required
to receive alimony or alimony pendente lite. In Harper, the mother only
filed claims for child custody, child support, and attorney’s fees, and
sought possession of the marital residence and a car incident to her
claims for child custody and support. In her complaint, she alleged that
she and the children’s father were not happy and that it was in the best
interests of the parties and the children for the parties to separate.28 She
did not allege that the father had committed misconduct or that he had
failed to provide adequate support for the family.29 Because the mother
did not file a claim for alimony or alimony pendente lite, she was not required to allege, and the trial court was not required to rule on, the existence of any of the statutorily enumerated fault grounds.
Judge John H. Parker, the trial judge presiding in Harper, recalled,
“I tried to avoid memorializing the parties’ bad acts on paper unless I had
to, by statute, in order to support the decision.”30 Judge Parker explained that had he deemed such a finding necessary, the evidence before the trial court could have supported a finding of misconduct. Specifically, he recalled that the mother in Harper was a soft-spoken, quiet
homemaker while the father was controlling, uncompromising, and
emotionally abusive to the rest of the family.31 He ran the parties’
household in military fashion and subjected the family to radical religious rituals against their wishes.32 Judge Parker omitted such findings
in the record because he was convinced that the court had the inherent
authority to provide for the support and welfare of children, including
their shelter and transportation, without a finding of misconduct of either party.33 Working on the premise that the children’s interests were
more important than the rights of the parties, Judge Parker found it to be
in the children’s best interests for the court to award possession of the
home to the children and custody of the children to the mother.34
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court’s belief that it
had the inherent authority to award use and possession of the marital

28. Harper v. Harper, 273 S.E.2d 731 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
29. Id. at 735.
30. Interview with The Honorable John H. Parker, Partner, Cheshire Parker
Schneider & Bryan, PLLC, in Raleigh, N.C. (Aug. 3, 2011).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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residence incident to child custody and support.35 Reasoning that the
mother’s complaint attempted to assert a claim for a “no fault” divorce
from bed and board, the Court of Appeals found that she “fail[ed] to
state a claim upon which relief [could] be granted” under North Carolina law.36 The court specifically held that:
[W]here, as here, husband and wife are living together, the children being in their joint custody and being adequately supported by the supporting spouse, in the absence of allegation[s] that would support an
award of alimony or divorce, one spouse may not maintain an action to
evict the other, get sole custody of the children, and obtain an order for
child support .37

The court relied on the language of section 50-13.4(e) in effect at
the time of the ruling, which stated, in relevant part, “Payment for the
support of a minor child shall be paid by lump sum payment, periodic payments, or by transfer of title or possession of personal property of any interest therein, or a security interest in real property, as the court may order”;
and contrasted the language of section 50-13.4 to the language of the
alimony statute, section 50-16.7(a), which expressly authorized the trial
court to award “possession of real property,” as opposed to only a security interest, as part of an alimony award.38 The court reasoned that,
“[e]ven if the wife and children had been living separate from the husband and there was a justiciable controversy as to custody and support,”
a judge may not “evict [the husband] from his home and assign it to his
wife for her use and that of the children, in the absence of allegations
and proof of matters that would also support an award of alimony or divorce [from bed and board].”39 Summarizing its ruling, the court concluded, “plaintiff, without just cause or excuse, wants out of the marriage, but not out of the marital home. The law cannot require her to
live with her husband, but it will not allow her to evict him.”40
A. State of the Law Pre-Baumann
Shortly after Harper was decided, the General Assembly amended
sections 50-13.4(e) and (f)(2) of the North Carolina General Statutes to
allow the trial court to award the possession of real property incident to
child support, despite the holding in Harper. As the trial judge respon35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Harper v. Harper, 273 S.E.2d 731, 735 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
Id. at 733–34.
Id. at 733.
Id. at 734.
Id.
Id. at 735.
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sible for the decision on appeal, Judge Parker received a copy of the
Court of Appeals’ decision before it was released as a slip opinion. Concerned about the potential implications and the weight the appellate
court placed on the inconsistency in statutory remedies for alimony and
child support, Judge Parker immediately approached Representative Joe
Hackney about amending the statutes and codifying what he believed
was the trial court’s inherent authority to provide shelter as a form of
child support.41 Within 72 hours of his meeting with Judge Parker, Representative Hackney proposed a bill that would expressly amend sections
50-13.4(e) and (f)(2) to allow courts to award the possession of real
property as a form of child support and a means to enforce non-payment
of support.42 The effect of the amendment should have been that a trial
court could award possession of the home to the party who was the recipient of child support payments. However, some courts still referred to
Harper to interpret section 50-13.4, despite the fact that the statute had
been amended.
As a result, prior to the ruling in Baumann, it was unclear whether a
party could rely successfully on the child support statutes as authority to
seek possession of the home prior to separation. Many district court
judges relied on Harper in support of the proposition that there was no
justiciable issue as to custody and support of children between parents
as long as the parents were living together and the children were being
adequately supported, absent allegations of fault. Accordingly, before
Baumann, the general belief among most North Carolina family law practitioners was that possession could only be ordered before separation as
part of a Chapter 50B domestic violence protective order, or as part of an
order for child support, post-separation support, or alimony entered after a divorce from bed and board had been granted.
III. THE BAUMANN DECISION
In Baumann, the mother filed a complaint against the father seeking
“temporary and permanent custody of the parties’ children, temporary
and permanent child support, post-separation support and alimony, and
attorney’s fees.”43 At the time the mother filed the complaint, the parties
had not separated.44 The mother alleged that she “desire[d] to separate

41. Interview with The Honorable John H. Parker, supra note 30.
42. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.4(e), (f)(2) (2011); Act of May 28, 1981, ch. 472 §
1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 736.
43. Baumann-Chacon v. Baumann, 710 S.E.2d 431, 432 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
44. Id.
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from [Defendant], but believe[d] it [was] in the parties’ and minor children’s best interest that the issues set forth [in her complaint] be resolved
before said separation occurr[ed.]”45 Neither party filed a claim for divorce from bed and board, and, as in Harper, the mother “made no written allegations of marital misconduct on the part of [the father] in her
Complaint.”46 In addition, and in contrast to Harper, the mother in
Baumann did not ask the court to remove the Defendant from the marital
home.47 The trial court concluded as a matter of law that it did not have
subject-matter jurisdiction over any of the mother’s claims “because
there was no evidence of a physical separation and there was no pending
claim by [the mother] for divorce from bed and board or possession of
the marital residence.”48
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial
court’s judgment, holding that the trial court did, in fact, have subjectmatter jurisdiction over the mother’s claims for custody and child support, even though the parties had not physically separated and no complaint for divorce from bed and board had been filed.49 As to the wife’s
post-separation support claim, the Court of Appeals found that the trial
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over that claim prior to a physical separation of the parties or a filing of divorce from bed and board.50
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion.51
The Court of Appeals relied on the statutory language governing
child custody, child support, and post-separation support in making its
decision. Citing multiple references to “date of separation” in the statutory provisions governing post-separation support, the Court of Appeals
found that the General Assembly did not contemplate the availability of
this remedy prior to separation.52 However, the court distinguished
claims relating to the economic needs of dependent spouses from those
related to the custody and care of children, finding that the statutory
45. Id.
46. Id. at 433.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 436
50. Id. at 437–38.
51. Immediately after the temporary hearing resulting in the order on appeal in
Baumann, the parties separated. Thereafter, and before the case came back before the
trial court on remand, the parties settled their issues privately outside of court via Separation Agreement; their divorce is now final. E-Mail from Alyscia Gray Ellis, Principal,
Ellis Family Law, PLLC, (Feb. 13, 2012) (on file with authors).
52. Baumann, 710 S.E.2d at 437.
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language governing child custody and child support does not require
physical separation or a complaint for divorce, either absolute or from
bed and board, to be filed before a court can address custody or support.53 Specifically, section 50-13.5(g) states, “orders for custody and
support of minor children may be entered when the matter is before the
court as provided by this section, irrespective of the rights of the wife and
the husband as between themselves in an action for annulment or an action
for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, or an action for alimony
without divorce.”54 The appellate court reasoned that the “history of the
applicable statutory provisions and the reasons underlying their enactment” did not reveal a legislative intent to require physical separation of
the parents.55
In support of its ruling, the Court of Appeals relied on Martin v.
Martin, in which it stated, “we have previously rejected the contention
that our courts may not award possession of real estate as a part of child
support” on the theory that “shelter is a necessary component of a child’s
needs and in many instances it is more feasible for a parent to provide
actual shelter than it is for the parent to provide monetary payments to
obtain shelter.”56 With respect to custody, the court cited Lee’s North
Carolina Family Law, which states: “a court may order possession of real
property as a payment of child support or as a way to effectuate an order
for custody.”57
Ultimately, the Baumann court asserted that “the purpose of actions
for child custody and child support is, consistently with the law’s overriding interest in protecting minor children, to assure that the needs of
such children are adequately met.”58 Relying on the principle set forth in
MacKenzie v. MacKenzie,59 that “[a] court having jurisdiction of children
located within the state surely has the inherent authority to protect those
children and make such temporary orders as their best interests may require[,]” the Court of Appeals held that child custody and child support
claims are not precluded by the fact that the parties have neither physi-

53. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.1, -13.5 (2011).
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.5(g) (emphasis added).
55. Baumann, 710 S.E.2d at 435; N.C. GEN. STAT § 50-13.5.
56. Martin v. Martin, 242 S.E.2d 393, 396–97 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (quoting Boulware v. Boulware, 208 S.E.2d. 239, 240–41 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974)).
57. 1 SUZANNE REYNOLDS, LEE’S NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 6.23(A) (5th ed.
1993).
58. Baumann, 710 S.E.2d at 436; see also Price v. Howard, 484 S.E.2d. 528, 530 (N.C.
1997).
59. MacKenzie v. MacKenzie, 204 S.E.2d 561, 563 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974).
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cally separated nor asserted divorce from bed and board claims against
each other.60
The Court of Appeals’ ruling in Baumann was consistent with the
trial court’s belief in Harper that the interests of children are paramount
to the rights of the parties as between themselves, whether to occupy the
marital residence or otherwise. As to parents’ “rights,” Judge Parker contends they are secondary and consist, arguably, of “constitutional standing that allows them a preeminent claim to seek custody/visitation as to
the rest of the world” and “the right to ask for support as trustee on behalf of a child.”61 He contends that children, on the other hand, have the
rights to be safe and secure in the custody of a party with “standing,” and
to be supported adequately.62 Both Judge Parker and the Court of Appeals’ ruling in Baumann suggest that, where children are involved,
North Carolina courts should have the authority to protect the interests
of the child over the interests of the parents, and the parents “rights,”
whatever they are, are secondary.
Distinguishing Harper from Baumann
As the Court of Appeals noted in its Baumann decision, Baumann
and Harper are distinguishable.63 Footnote four of the Baumann opinion
reads as though the Court of Appeals viewed Harper as focusing more
narrowly on the issue of whether one spouse could be evicted from the
marital residence incident to custody or child support before separation
without allegations or findings of fault.64 In Baumann, the issue was
whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter any custody or child support order before separation of the parties.65 While
Harper held that a trial court could not enter an order that resulted in a
marital separation without establishing fault on the part of the noncustodial parent,66 Baumann relied on section 50-13.4 of the North Carolina General Statutes to conclude that the court can enter pre-separation
orders addressing child custody and child support, which may effectuate
separation by awarding possession of the parties’ residence to the custodial parent.67 Accordingly, the court’s holding in Baumann is broader
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Baumann, 710 S.E.2d at 436 (quoting MacKenzie, 204 S.E.2d at 563).
Interview with The Honorable John H. Parker, supra note 30.
Id.
Baumann, 710 S.E.2d at 436 n.4.
Id.
Id. at 432.
Harper v. Harper, 273 S.E.2d 731, 735 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
Baumann, 710 S.E.2d at 436.
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than the holding in Harper, and creates a procedural gateway for litigants
who want to address custody and child support issues while they are still
living together.
Consistent with the trial court’s belief in Harper, the court’s ruling
in Baumann clarified that the interests of children are paramount to
rights of the mother and father as between themselves. The Baumann
ruling is also consistent with the evolving concept of needs over fault in
other domestic claims. Because a finding of fault is not necessary to determine the best interests of a child or to provide the support necessary
to meet a child’s reasonable needs, post-Baumann trial court judges now
have the clear authority to do what the appellate court found the trial
court could not do in Harper.
IV. INTERSTATE COMPARISON
A sampling of other states’ approaches to the court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction to enter orders awarding exclusive possession of the marital
residence, custody or support demonstrates some important trends in
this area of the law, especially as it relates to fault grounds and separation.
A. New York
In New York, claims for child custody, child support and pendente
lite spousal maintenance, as well as payment of expenses for the house
(mortgage, taxes, insurance, utilities, etc.) by the supporting spouse, can
be initiated while the parties are still living in the same house. New
York Domestic Relations Law section 236(B)(8)(b) provides that:
In any action where the court has ordered temporary maintenance,
maintenance, distributive award or child support, the court may direct
that payment be made directly to the other spouse or a third person for
real and personal property and services furnished to the other spouse, or
for the rental or mortgage amortization or interest payments, insurances,
taxes, repairs, or other carrying charges on premises occupied by the
other spouse, or for both payments to the other spouse and to such third
persons. Such direction may be made notwithstanding that the parties continue to reside in the same abode and notwithstanding that the court refuses to grant the relief requested by the other spouse.68

68. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(8)(b) (McKinney 2010) (emphasis added).
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Thus, in New York, temporary spousal support, child support, and
counsel fees may be awarded where the parties continue to reside in the
same household.69
As to child custody, subdivision 1 of section 240 requires the court
to inquire into both the custody and support arrangements for children
in the context of certain matrimonial litigation (i.e., actions to annul a
marriage; to declare the nullity of a void marriage; for a separation; and
for a divorce),70 whether the parents or other adult litigants raise issues
concerning the children or not. Consistent with the North Carolina
Court of Appeals’ rationale in Baumann, New York courts have an affirmative obligation to ensure that children who are within its jurisdiction
are placed in the care of the most appropriate custodian, and that the
persons legally responsible for their support are obligated to provide an
appropriate level of support.71 Jurisdiction to determine child custody
and support is not dependent on whether matrimonial relief is granted,
and the court may provide for child custody and support even if matri-

69. See Salerno v. Salerno, 531 N.Y.S.2d 101, 103 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (“[M]ere
fact that parties continue to reside in same household after commencement of matrimonial action does not preclude award of temporary maintenance or temporary child
support; such awards are designed to insure that reasonable needs are met during the
pendency of matrimonial litigation.” (citing Cohen v. Cohen, 514 N.Y.S.2d 45, 45 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1987))); see also Malin v. Malin, 326 N.Y.S.2d 30, 31–32 (N.Y. App. Div.
1971) (noting that denial of temporary alimony, child support, and counsel fees was not
appropriate simply because the complaint was not served on the husband even though
wife was living with husband when the separation action was brought).
70. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240. The Equitable Distribution Law defines the term matrimonial action to include, in addition to the four categories listed above, actions for the
“dissolution of a marriage” (i.e., Enoch Arden proceedings, see N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§
220, 221); for the declaration of the validity or nullity of a foreign judgment of divorce;
for the declaration of the validity of a marriage; and proceedings to obtain equitable distribution or maintenance following a foreign judgment of divorce. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
236(B)(2); see also CPLR 105 (subd. p). While these actions are defined as matrimonial
actions for equitable distribution and other economic purposes, no jurisdiction is conveyed to permit custody determinations to be made as ancillary relief in such actions. Cf.
Gontaryk v. Gontaryk, 246 N.Y.S.2d 270, 270–71 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964). In order to obtain a custody determination, an independent proceeding must be initiated in either the
Supreme Court or Family Court. However, subdivision 7 of Part B of section 236 permits the court to award temporary or permanent child support in “any matrimonial action.” N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(2). Thus, in any matrimonial action, defined as
such by the Equitable Distribution Law, the court may determine child support but may
not decide the issue of custody unless the action is one of the types of action specifically
identified in section 240 of New York’s Domestic Relations Laws. Alan D. Sheinkman,
Practice Commentaries, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (2010).
71. Sheinkman, supra note 70, § 240.
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monial status relief is denied. 72 In fact, New York courts have ordered
custody or parenting schedules, including weeknight responsibility for
the children, between parents living in the same house and awarding
each spouse exclusive use and occupancy of different portions of the
same house.73
While New York does not statutorily address whether a trial court
may award possession of the marital residence incident to child custody
or child support, New York Domestic Relations Law section 234 vests
the court with the authority to award exclusive occupancy of the marital
residence during the pendency of an action.74 Section 234 specifically
states, in relevant part, that the court may:
[M]ake such direction, between the parties, concerning the possession of
property, as in the court’s discretion justice requires having regard to the
circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. Such direction
may be made in the final judgment, or by one or more orders from time
to time before or subsequent to final judgment.75

Notwithstanding this broad statutory language, certain decisional
standards have evolved, limiting the trial court’s application of section
234 to award possession of the marital residence to a party on an interim
basis. For example, courts have consistently held that a pendente lite
award of exclusive occupancy of the marital residence should not be
granted unless it is demonstrated that it “is necessary to protect the safety of persons and property.”76 In most situations, possession of the marital residence may not be awarded on an ex parte basis.77 However,
where extrinsic evidence (such as police reports, medical records, the
issuance of an order of protection, or third-party affidavits) corroborates
the moving party’s allegations, the court may grant exclusive occupancy
without a hearing.78

72. E.g., Caldwell v. Caldwell, 81 N.E.2d 60 (N.Y. 1948); Miller v. Miller, 198
N.Y.S.2d 320 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960); La Rosa v. La Rosa, 373 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1975).
73. E-mail from Theresa A. Girolamo, Associate, Goldschmidt & Genovese LLP
(Oct. 19, 2011) (on file with authors).
74. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 234.
75. Id.
76. 2 TIMOTHY TIPPINS, NEW YORK MATRIMONIAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 17:33 (2011)
(citing Blumenfield v. Blumenfield, 466 N.Y.S.2d 63 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)); see also Tillinger v. Tillinger, 502 N.Y.S.2d 493, 493 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (noting that relief will
be denied where there is insufficient evidence to show that exclusive use and occupancy
is necessary to protect the safety of persons or property).
77. TIPPINS, supra note 76, § 17:33 (citing Blumenfield, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 63).
78. See Vallet v. Vallet, 446 N.Y.S.2d 605 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
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Other factors that have been considered by New York courts in determining motions for exclusive occupancy of the marital residence on
an interim basis include the availability of alternative accommodations
to the spouse seeking exclusion, the availability of housing to the party
who is the target of the motion, the proximity of the marital residence to
one party’s employment, and the fact that the marital residence also
serves as the place of business of one of the spouses.79 These standards
reflect a judicial recognition in New York that an indiscriminate granting
of exclusive occupancy orders would be tantamount to a summary eviction proceeding by parties to matrimonial litigation not intended by the
statute,80 echoing the concerns of the North Carolina Court of Appeals
in Harper.81
B.

California

In California, one may seek pendente lite exclusive occupancy of the
marital residence upon a showing that he or she is “more entitled” to reside there based upon a balancing of factors specified in section 6321 of
the California Family Code (for domestic violence cases) and section
6340 (for non-domestic violence cases). Specifically, section 6321(a)
states,
The court may issue an ex parte order excluding a party from the
family dwelling, the dwelling of the other party, the common dwelling of
both parties, or the dwelling of the person who has care, custody, and
control of a child to be protected from domestic violence for the period
of time and on the conditions the court determines, regardless of which
party holds legal or equitable title or is the lessee of the dwelling.82

Section 6340(b) states,
The court may issue an order described in Section 6321 excluding a
person from a dwelling if the court finds that physical or emotional harm
would otherwise result to the other party, to a person under the care,

79. TIPPINS, supra note 76, § 17:33 (citing Baylek v. Baylek, 442 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61
(N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Rauch v. Rauch, 441 N.Y.S.2d 749, 750 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981);
Binet v. Binet, 385 N.Y.S.2d 564, 565 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)).
80. Id.
81. Exclusive use and occupancy of the marital residence can also be awarded in
New York where one spouse has voluntarily established an alternative residence and the
spouse’s presence has caused domestic strife. See Kristiansen v. Kristiansen, 534
N.Y.S.2d 104 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); see also Preston v. Preston, 537 N.Y.S.2d 824 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 490 N.Y.S.2d 555 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
82. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6321 (2004).
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custody and control of the other party, or to a minor child of the parties
or of the other party.83

In its practical application, the statutory language results in an airing of the equities for the court to decide who gets to remain in the marital residence. The court is to consider factors such as whether one party has primary custody of children who go to school nearby, the
existence or non-existence of domestic violence, the need for one party
to use the residence for work or employment purposes, and whether one
party was the primary tenant or owner of the residence prior to marriage, among other things.84 Consistent with its no-fault approach to the
dissolution of marriage, California does not require a finding of fault to
award possession of the marital residence to a party.85
Moreover, in California, intact couples can reside in separate residences while legally separated parties may reside in the same residence
(though it is more difficult to prove a date of separation when parties
have chosen not to physically separate).86 In fact, the latter is an economic reality for many in certain regions of California, including the Bay
area.87 In California, one party may also seek custody or support orders
while the parties are residing together, but separated. Support orders
can be made, as can orders regarding the ongoing payment of various
community property obligations (i.e., mortgages, credit card payments),
and those obligations often impact the amount of support that is ordered.88
Family Code section 2010 is the basic jurisdictional statute for custody and support determinations in proceedings for dissolution of marriage, nullity or legal separation in California.89 Independent actions for
exclusive custody, brought pursuant to section 3120 without request for
legal separation or dissolution of the marriage, are governed by all of the
same statutory considerations as in custody disputes arising in regular
dissolution proceedings.90 Family Code section 3120 specifically states,

83. Id. § 6340.
84. E-mail from Yasmine S. Mehmet, Principal, Law Offices of Yasmine S. Mehmet
(Oct. 14, 2011) (on file with authors).
85. Juick v. Juick, 98 Cal. Rptr. 324, 329 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1971).
86. E-mail from Yasmine S. Mehmet, supra note 84.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2010 (2004).
90. Id. § 3021(d) (2004); 1 JUDITH R. FORMAN & PATRICIA PHILLIPS, CALIFORNIA
TRANSACTIONS FORMS —FAMILY LAW § 3:4 (2011).
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Without filing a petition for dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties, the husband or wife may bring an action for the exclusive custody of the children of the marriage. The court may, during
the pendency of the action, or at the final hearing thereof, or afterwards,
make such order regarding the support, care, custody, education, and
control of the children of the marriage as may be just and in accordance
with the natural rights of the parents and the best interest of the children. The order may be modified or terminated at any time thereafter as
the natural rights of the parties and the best interest of the children may
require.91

Accordingly, California practitioners have seen cases where one
party lived upstairs and the other downstairs, and the children dutifully
went between floors on the respective parents’ custodial days.92 Given
the ruling in Baumann, the same or similar scenario may now be a possibility for parents residing together in North Carolina, whether they are
contemplating separation or not.
C. Maryland
The development of the law in Maryland regarding subject-matter
jurisdiction to make pre-separation orders for child-related claims has
followed a very similar track to that in North Carolina, including an emphasis and subsequent de-emphasis on fault. For example, in the 1952
case of Sheinin v. Sheinin, the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court’s decision to grant the wife a limited divorce93 based on the husband’s constructive desertion of her and awarded her alimony, custody
of the children, and child support.94 As the wife’s complaint included a
claim for limited divorce based on fault, and there appears to have been
ample evidence to support finding the husband at fault,95 it is likely the
Harper court would have agreed with the decision in Sheinin.
However, in the more recent case of Ricketts v. Ricketts,96 decided by
the Maryland Court of Appeals in 2006, the court interpreted and explained Maryland’s child custody and support statutes in the same way
91. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3120.
92. E-mail from Yasmine S. Mehmet, supra note 84.
93. The term “divorce” as used by the court in Ricketts, refers to a “limited divorce.”
This is analogous to a divorce from bed and board under section 50-7 of the North Carolina General Statutes. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-7 (2011).
94. Sheinin v. Sheinin, 89 A.2d 609, 612–13 (Md. 1952).
95. For instance, Mr. Sheinin had an extramarital relationship with his secretary,
whom he moved into the marital home while he and Mrs. Sheinin were still living together with their children. Sheinin, 89 A.2d at 610–11.
96. Ricketts v. Ricketts, 903 A.2d 857 (Md. 2006).
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that Baumann addressed sections 50-13.4 and 50-13.5 of the North Carolina General Statutes.97 On its face, section 5-203(d)(1) of Maryland’s
Family Law Code appears to predicate the court’s authority to enter orders regarding child custody upon the parties’ separation. This section
provides that “[i]f the parents live apart, a court may award custody of a
minor child to either parent or joint custody to both parents.”98 The
Court of Appeals in Ricketts carefully analyzed section 5-203(d)(1) in
the context of section 1-20199—the statute granting power to courts of
equity—and its previous decisions in cases concerning jurisdiction over
child custody matters while the parties were not separated. The Ricketts
court concluded that “[t]he trial court . . . , whether, or not, it concludes
that Mr. Ricketts is entitled to a divorce, has the jurisdiction and the
power to determine the custody, visitation, and support of the Ricketts’
children.”100
The Maryland Court of Appeals agreed that section 1-201 “does
more than simply describe the court’s jurisdiction; it instead is a grant of
power, imbuing the courts with the responsibility to determine custody,
visitation, and support regardless of whether the parents are divorced or
physically separated.”101 Consistent with this interpretation, the court
discussed its earlier decisions in Barnhard102 and Mower.103
The court noted that the case of Barnhard v. Godfrey was decided
“just months before the enactment of the predecessor legislation to [section] 5-203(a)” in 1929.104 In that case, the Court of Appeals held that
the “then applicable statute . . . empower[ed] the equity courts, whenever application for that relief was sought by one or both parents, to determine custody, support, and visitation ‘without regard to the question
of whether or not the parents of said child or children have been divorced or are living apart.’”105 The court further noted that the predecessor to section 5-203(a) recognized the equity court’s “‘inherent power . . . over minors’”106 and that the exercise of the power should be done
“‘with the paramount purpose in view of securing the welfare and pro-

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See discussion supra Part IV.
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-203(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2006).
Id. § 1-201.
Ricketts, 903 A.2d at 870.
Id. at 867.
Barnhard v. Godfrey, 145 A. 614 (Md. 1929).
Mower v. Mower, 121 A.2d 185 (Md. 1956).
Ricketts, 903 A.2d at 868.
Id. (quoting Barnhard, 145 A. at 615).
Id. (quoting Barnhard, 145 A. at 615).
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moting the best interest of the children.’”107 In light of its decision in
Barnhard, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the legislature’s enactment
of a custody statute requiring separation as a condition to making a custody award “did not disturb the courts’ right to determine custody, support, or visitation when divorce was not decreed.”108
In Mower v. Mower,109 the wife’s complaint for alimony pendente lite,
child custody, child support, and attorney’s fees included a claim for a
limited divorce.110 Finding no grounds for a limited divorce where both
parties were at fault “as they were content to live in a state of animosity
and estrangement and that, therefore, no desertion had occurred,”111 the
trial court refused to grant the divorce and dismissed the wife’s other
claims.112 The Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the trial court’s
decision, holding that the court had jurisdiction to rule on the wife’s
claims for custody and support regardless of whether a limited divorce
was granted.113
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals’ rationale for its holding in Ricketts
was the same as Judge Parker’s reasoning114 for awarding custody of the
children and possession of the house to the wife in Harper. Like Judge
Parker, the Court of Appeals concluded that its approach was “consistent
with the primacy of the interests of the child and the courts’ paramount
concern ‘to secure the welfare and promote the child’s best interests.’”115
Four years after the Ricketts decision, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in Baumann.
D. Missouri
In Missouri, either party may file a motion for temporary relief
while the case is pending and prior to separation. Missouri courts do
not have to address the questions of statutory interpretation that arose in
Harper and Baumann to determine whether trial courts have jurisdiction
to decide the issues of child custody and child support before separation
because the legislature has unambiguously provided the courts with this
107. Id. (quoting Barnhard, 145 A. at 615).
108. Id.
109. Mower v. Mower, 121 A.2d 185 (Md. 1956).
110. Id. at 186.
111. Ricketts, 903 A.2d at 869 (citing Mower, 121 A.2d at 186).
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing Mower, 121 A.2d at 187).
114. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text.
115. Ricketts, 903 A.2d at 870 (quoting Stancill v. Stancill, 408 A.2d 1030, 1033 (Md.
1979)).
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authority. Specifically, section 452.315 of Vernon’s Annotated Missouri
Statutes provides, in relevant part:
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation, either
party may move for temporary maintenance and for temporary support
for each child entitled to support. . . . As a part of a motion for temporary maintenance or support or by independent motion accompanied by
affidavit, either party may request the court to issue an order after notice
and hearing: . . . excluding a party from the family home or from the
home of the other party upon a showing that physical or emotional harm
would otherwise result; [or] establishing and ordering compliance with a
custody order and providing for the support of each child.116

The purpose of such temporary relief is to maintain the status quo during the pendency of litigation.117
Thus, in Missouri, claims for child custody, child support, alimony
pendente lite, and counsel fees can be commenced and awards made
while the parties are living under the same roof.118 A more frequently
litigated question than whether the trial courts have the authority to order pre-separation relief is whether a separation has actually occurred.
Unlike North Carolina, and similar to California, the parties can be considered separated even while they are still living in the same residence.
Missouri case law has defined the term ‘living together as husband and
wife’ as meaning “the dwelling together in the same house, eating at the
same table, the two parties, the man and woman in question, holding
themselves out to the world and conducting themselves toward each
other as husband and wife.”119 For example, in O’Brien v. O’Brien,120 the
Missouri Court of Appeals held that where plaintiff wife and defendant
husband lived in the same residence during the hearing on the wife’s
motion for alimony and child support pendente lite, the trial court was
not precluded from granting her motion121 where the parties had been
living separate and apart as far as their marital relationship, and she

116. MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.315 (West 2012).
117. See Coleberd v. Coleberd, 933 S.W.2d 863, 871 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Tisone v.
Tisone, 881 S.W.2d 647, 648 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); In re Marriage of Kovach, 873 S.W.2d
604, 607 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Berbiglia v. Berbiglia, 442 S.W.2d 949, 951–52 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1969).
118. See Lipp v. Lipp, 117 S.W.2d 364, 365–66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938) (holding that
suit money was not precluded where husband and wife were sheltered by the same roof
because the court concluded they were living separate and apart rather than as husband
and wife).
119. Id. at 365 (citing Levy v. Goldsoll, 131 S.W. 420, 421–22 (1910)).
120. O’Brien v. O’Brien, 485 S.W.2d 674 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
121. Id. at 678.
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moved to an apartment shortly after the hearing.122 In contrast, and as
further illustration, in the Missouri case of Harper v. Harper,123 the wife
brought suit for divorce and when the officer went to serve process on
the defendant, the plaintiff and defendant were occupying the same bed;
on those facts, the Supreme Court held that the parties had not separated
and were living together as man and wife, and denied the relief requested.124
E. Kansas
Given its proximity to Missouri, one might expect a similar approach in the state of Kansas, but to no avail. Kansas takes a drastically
different approach to pre-separation orders on temporary support and
child custody from other states. Under section 60-1607(a) of the Kansas
Annotated Statutes, a court has the authority to enter temporary orders
concerning, among other things, “the disposition of the property of the
parties,”125 “the use, occupancy, management and control of [the parties’]
property,”126 and “the legal custody and residency of and parenting time
with the minor children and the support, if necessary, of either party and
of the minor children during the pendency of the action.”127 There is no
requirement for the parties to be separated prior to commencing an action seeking temporary relief under section 60-1607. In addition, section 60-1607(b) expressly allows the court to hear and decide these matters on an ex parte basis, but restricts a party’s ability to obtain an ex
parte order that has “the effect of changing the residency of a minor child
from the parent who has had the sole de facto residency of the child to
the other parent”128 to situations in which “there is sworn testimony to
support a showing of extraordinary circumstances.”129 Accordingly,
Kansas courts have the authority to enter orders regarding possession
122. Id. at 676.
123. Harper v. Harper, 29 Mo. 301 (1860).
124. Id. at 302–04. Note, however, that in Missouri there is no vehicle for the division of property prior to the final disposition, and the trial court has a duty to fully dispose of the property of the parties in its decree. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.330.5 (West
2012) (“The court’s order as it affects distribution of marital property shall be a final order not subject to modification . . . .”); see also In re Long, 148 B.R. 904, 908 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1992); Morgan v. Morgan, 249 S.W.3d 226, 230–31 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008);
Gurtz v. Gurtz, 186 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
125. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1607(a)(1) (2011).
126. Id.
127. Id. § 60-1607(a)(3).
128. Id. § 60-1607(b).
129. Id.
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and ownership of the marital residence, even on an ex parte basis, before
the parties have separated.
If an ex parte order is entered, the court is required to hold a hearing “within 15 days of the date on which a party requests a hearing
whether to vacate or modify the order.”130 The onus is on the defendant
spouse to file a motion and establish why the court’s decision, which was
made without that spouse’s input or involvement, is incorrect. The practical, if not legal, effect of section 60-1607(b) is to create a presumption
in favor of the plaintiff spouse. In fact, it is entirely possible that one
spouse could wake up in the morning at the marital residence, go to
work, and then come home in the evening expecting to have dinner with
his or her family, only to find that a court has awarded possession of the
home to the other spouse, along with custody of the parties’ children.
As a result, the ousted spouse, who may not have even been aware that
his or her partner was contemplating litigation, is immediately at a disadvantage.131
Kansas’s approach can result in the type of outcome that the Harper
court sought to prevent—a potentially innocent spouse who wants to
remain in the parties’ marriage being banned from the marital residence.
While Baumann gives North Carolina judges the ability to exercise discretion to determine when it is appropriate to consider and rule on
claims for custody and child support prior to separation, and award possession of the marital residence incident to those claims, Baumann specifically excepts the same relief incident to claims for post-separation
support prior to the parties’ separation. Kansas does not protect the
rights of the defendant spouse in the same way and, some may argue,
reaches too far into the lives of an otherwise intact family.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF BAUMANN
While in most instances it would be unnecessary to address child
custody and child support before the parties have separated, there may
be circumstances in which it would be appropriate or even essential for
the trial court to resolve these issues prior to separation in order to ensure that the best interests of the children are met.132 The holding in
Baumann does not place any clear limitations on trial judges’ authority to
enter pre-separation child custody and child support orders in North
130. Id.
131. E-mail from Preston A. Drobeck, Assoc., Berkowitz, Cook & Gondring, (Oct. 14,
2011) (on file with authors).
132. See Baumann-Chacon v. Baumann, 710 S.E.2d 431, 436 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012

21

WHITLOCK FINAL

4/12/2012 9:09 AM

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 5

470

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:449

Carolina. This means that trial courts will have to use their discretion in
making determinations about the propriety of entering such orders on a
case-by-case basis.
Because of its far-reaching implications, Baumann has already raised
concerns for many North Carolina family law practitioners about the
possibility of governmental intrusion into an “intact” family. As a result
of the decision, there is vast uncertainty as to when it might now be
plausible for a court to address these issues prior to separation. Examples may include a same-sex couple living together where a complaint is
filed solely for the purpose of indicating that the non-biological parent
has custodial rights with respect to medical or academic matters; a married couple that has no intention of separating, where one parent disagrees with the other as to whether a child should be baptized or raised in
the Jewish faith, where one parent consents to a critical medical procedure but the other refuses to allow the treatment, or where one parent
consents to private school enrollment and the other insists that the child
attend public school. The current statutory and case law in North Carolina does not provide any clear parameters to the trial court’s authority
to rule in these cases and, as a result, some practitioners fear we are facing a slippery slope.
Practical Application
In addition to the substantive—and potentially problematic—
implications described above, the Baumann ruling also has procedural
implications that will affect the way North Carolina lawyers practice law.
The ruling in Baumann makes it clear that either party can now file
claims for child custody and child support prior to separation. While
the trial court can award possession of the house to the party receiving
payment of child support,133 the obligor cannot obtain possession of the
house pursuant to section 50-13.4(e).134 While the Court of Appeals relies on Lee’s North Carolina Family Law for the premise that “a court may
order possession of real property as payment of child support or as a way
to effectuate an order for custody,” it is unclear based on the strict statutory language whether a custody claim alone would be sufficient to obtain an award of possession of the marital residence.135

133. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(e) (2011).
134. Jill Jackson, Address at Intensive Seminar, N.C. Bar Ass’n: Essential Elements of
Money Claims: What You Need to Allege and Prove to Prevail (Fall 2011).
135. REYNOLDS, supra note 57, § 6.23(A).
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The Baumann ruling did not change the state of the law that either
party can file a claim for divorce from bed and board prior to separation.
The trial court can award possession of a house to a party who prevails
on a claim for divorce from bed and board.136 In addition, the trial court
can award possession of a house to the party receiving payment of
spousal support;137 however, the obligor cannot obtain possession of the
house pursuant to section 50-16.7(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes. In light of Baumann, it is unclear whether a dependent spouse can
file post-separation support and/or alimony claims prior to separation if
he or she also asserts a claim for divorce from bed and board. Harper
discussed, but did not decide, whether a claim for alimony can be filed
prior to separation because, in that case, the wife did not assert a claim
for alimony. Baumann did not discuss divorce from bed and board because, in that case, the wife did not assert a claim for divorce from bed
and board. However, Baumann clearly holds that post-separation support claims cannot be filed prior to separation and is silent as to whether
any exception would apply if such a claim is filed simultaneously with a
claim for divorce from bed and board. As a result, more conservative
practitioners may elect to file a complaint for divorce from bed and
board and, once adjudicated, assert claims for post-separation support
and alimony by motion in the cause.
CONCLUSION
At this time, the statutory and case law in North Carolina does not
provide any clear parameters or limits to the trial court’s authority to
hear and decide the issues of child custody and child support prior to
the parties’ separation, and it would be impossible to prescribe a framework that would encompass every situation that may arise with regard to
child custody or support. North Carolina practitioners will have to wait
on future interpretive appellate cases or legislative amendments for
guidance on when it would be inappropriate for the trial court to invoke
its authority to decide these issues. Until then, North Carolina district
court judges will face the difficult task of balancing the competing concerns of governmental intrusion into an intact family with the duty to
provide for the safety and welfare, support and maintenance of children
within the jurisdiction. While we venture into the unknown, North
Carolina will have to trust its trial judges to determine when it is neces-

136. See Harper v. Harper, 273 S.E.2d 731 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (requiring fault allegations that would support award of “alimony” or “divorce”).
137. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.7(a).
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sary to invoke the power of the state to protect the interests of children,
even when those interests conflict with the rights of parents.
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